

The Impact of Political Relations on Economic Diplomacy and Its Inefficiency in the Pahlavi Period on Iran-Afghanistan Relations

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ABSTRACT: Afghanistan's relations with Iran have a special place and importance in terms of regional relations. Iran is one of the powerful and influential countries in the political and economic equations of the region and the world, which is Afghanistan's western neighbor due to its long border and many religious commonalities. , Has good cultural and linguistic relations with Afghanistan. Iran-Afghanistan relations have been based on many commonalities in history, culture and religion. During the Pahlavi regime, there was relative peace between the two countries and the rulers of the two countries had cordial relations with each other. The relations between Iran and Afghanistan during the reign of Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi should be examined in the context of the situation in Iran at that time. After Dr. Mossadegh announced a policy of negative balance and his slogan was independence from the superpowers, the global atmosphere demanded that countries with moderate power be linked to one of the power blocs. The same policy of Dr. Mossadegh led to the coup d'etat against him in August 1932, and finally Dr. Mossadegh came down from power. It was after the fall of Dr. Mossadegh that the then Iranian government chose the option of allying with the Western bloc and entered pro-Western countries. With Iran's entry into the Baghdad Security Treaty (Sento), it turned to an alliance with the West.

Keywords: Economic diplomacy, Pahlavi, political relations, Iran, Afghanistan.

INTRODUCTION

The relations between Iran and Afghanistan during the reign of Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi should be examined in the context of the situation in Iran at that time. After Dr. Mossadegh announced a policy of negative balance and his slogan was independence from the superpowers, the global atmosphere demanded that countries with moderate power be linked to one of the power blocs. The same policy of Dr. Mossadegh led to the coup d'etat against him in August 1932, and finally Dr. Mossadegh came down from power. It was after the fall of Dr. Mossadegh that the then Iranian government chose the option of allying with the Western bloc and entered pro-Western countries. With Iran's entry into the Baghdad Security Treaty (Sento), it turned to an alliance with the West. During these years, Iran's foreign policy was formed in order to be more fully aligned with the West and the United States. During this period, the government of Iran made many efforts to attract foreign investment to the country in order to realize the necessary investments to advance its social development programs (Farhang, 2006: 34). It was during these years that the government of Mohammad Daud Khan ruled Afghanistan. He sought to pursue his reform programs in Afghanistan as quickly as possible. Therefore, he tried to get closer to the Western countries, which during these years provided financial and weapons aid to the neighboring countries in order to prevent the infiltration of communism, and to remove the traditional conservatism common in Afghanistan. In Kabul, the President of the United States explicitly stated the wishes and aspirations of his government to receive financial and military assistance from the United States and to get closer to the country. These demands were met by the United States' refusal to comply with them. The United States has made aid conditional on de-escalation of tensions between

Pakistan and Afghanistan. This rejection of the US request shifted Kabul's gaze to Moscow. From here, the cornerstone of Afghanistan's dependence on Moscow was formed and Afghanistan turned to the socialist center. In the mid-1930s, with the expansion of Afghanistan's dependence on the Soviet Union at the political, military, economic, and even civil and cultural levels, a group of Soviet-trained left-wing youth in Afghanistan gradually became the first ideological establishment of the regime. Moscow, provided in Afghanistan (Tanin, 2011: 26). Afghanistan, in fact, plunged itself into a power that gradually promoted Marxist ideas among its people. During these years, Iran, not only in terms of its domestic and international position, was not able to act as a regional supporter for Afghanistan, but also in these years, there was basically no desire for independent regional action in the Iranian government. In 1940, when Iran witnessed the deepening of its ties with the West, Afghanistan was heavily dependent on Soviet policies due to its lack of connection to global capital on the one hand and the constraints of government planning. During this period, Iran was accompanied by a transition to development and Afghanistan was stagnant. In the same decade, Iran took the first step towards stabilizing its peripheral position in relation to its two eastern neighbors, Afghanistan and Pakistan. This action was the successful mediation of the imperial government of Iran between the two countries. The Iranian government announced its readiness to mediate between the two countries to resolve their late disputes in the Pashtunistan conflict. During the talks between the foreign ministers of the three countries in the presence of the Shah, a joint declaration was issued, known as the June 27 Declaration. Afghans and Pakistan re-established diplomatic relations (Madani, 1361: 37). In the same years, negotiations between Iran and Afghanistan over how to divide the Helmand River were fruitless. But the cultural and economic relations between the two countries continued in the same traditional forms and were not affected by new methods.

The beginning of economic diplomacy between Iran and Afghanistan

In the post-revolutionary years, the country's economic diplomacy has always had a fluctuating position according to the views of various governments on the issue of globalization and international relations. During these years, incompatibility between political and economic issues in the country's foreign policies with the dominance of political issues has always been an obstacle to the growth of the country's economic diplomacy. "De-escalation of tensions with the international system in the constructive government", "Multilateralism and bilateral interactions with economic powers in the reform government", "Bilateral economic interactions with developing countries in the government of kindness" and "Increasing foreign relations and reducing international tensions" In the government of moderation "are among the measures taken by post-revolutionary governments to improve economic diplomacy. Economic diplomacy with the expansion of the process of economic globalization has been considered as one of the new tools of foreign policy. The globalization of the economy in its evolutionary process has internal logics that need to be understood. Because ignoring them causes economic diplomacy to not have a proper place in foreign policy. In fact, economic diplomacy emerges when there is an initial alignment between the logics of economic globalization and the formulations of foreign policy. This article addresses the question of what is the role and role of economic diplomacy in the foreign policy of the construction period? The research hypothesis is that despite the priority of economic development logic, economic diplomacy was considered as a reaction due to the priority of the domestic arena over the international arena and the continuation of the government's role in the economic field and the influence of political issues on the economy.

Iran's economic diplomacy in the Pahlavi period

Iran's economy underwent significant improvements during the Pahlavi dynasty, which is more favorable than the experience of countries such as Turkey and Egypt, which were better off in terms of development after World War I. Reza Shah's priority after seizing power He was able to rule the whole country and build a central bureaucracy. He formed a national army, established military service, established the Minister of Economic and Social Infrastructure, and reformed the country's financial, administrative, legal, and educational systems. In addition to legal and institutional reforms, Reza Shah placed considerable emphasis on the development of the country's infrastructure. He initiated a number of important transportation and telecommunication projects, the most ambitious of which was the construction of the 1,394-kilometer national railway of Iran, which connects the Shah port in the Caspian Sea with the port of Shahpour in the Persian Gulf. The project began in 1927 and took 17 years to complete. It cost about \$ 150 million and was largely offset by additional taxes on tea and sugar imports. By comparison, spending was more limited on other types of infrastructure, such as water resources development, electricity generation, and housing. Reza Shah's government was characterized by nationalist and self-sufficient economic policies, the replacement of the economic system of inclusive foreign commissions during the Qajar period, with state monopolies, and the government's direct involvement in large-scale productive and infrastructure investments. His model was Kamal Ata Turk's reform and modernization policies in Turkey. Reza Shah established a monopoly on foreign trade, exercised strict control over foreign exchange, founded the first National Bank of Iran, tried to take over

the printing of banknotes from the British-owned Royal Bank, began major reforms in the legal system, and legislated. It had implications for education, public health, government bureaucracy, and conscription. Although Reza Shah's economic agenda was driven more by nationalist zeal than by a comprehensive development strategy, there is no doubt that his economic and social reforms played a key role in rescuing Iran from the economic and political anarchy that plagued the country after World War I. The fall of Reza Shah and the presence of foreign troops in Iran from 1941 to 1946 drastically changed the balance of political forces. A long period of confusion and political and economic uncertainty occurred with numerous changes of government, rising prices, and food shortages. Many political coalitions were formed and quickly disbanded. The general cost of living index quadrupled between 1941 and 1943. Many new industrial plants were forced to reduce their operations due to shortages of raw materials and spare parts. These shortcomings also delayed the development of small local industries. Numerous government efforts to resolve financial and economic issues were unsuccessful, and even after the end of the war, economic uncertainty persisted. The Allied occupation of Iran during World War II and the beginning of political instability did not allow Mohammad Reza Shah to have much influence over economic or social policy. This initial period lasted until after Mossadegh was ousted as prime minister in August 1953, and was characterized by a fierce economic and political struggle for control of oil, one of the country's most valuable resources. Mohammad Reza Shah, after taking full power with the strong support of the Kennedy administration in the United States, continued his father's secular reform program and began a series of social and economic reforms that, coupled with steadily increasing oil revenues, enabled the economy to have one of the fastest growing periods. Endure stable and low inflation. In the period 1953-1958, the mass production of the economy, which is measured by gross national product at constant prices, increased at an average annual rate of 10.5 percent and prices remained limited to the rate of increase between 2.6 and 3 percent. However, rapid industrialization, which was largely achieved through government intervention and continued with an almost monopoly decline in oil revenues, led to a number of adverse economic and social consequences.

30s and 40s to 1943 and statistics of astonishing economic prosperity

In the aftermath of the 1943 repression, and the consolidation of the US ally in Iran, Iran's economic growth indicators improved dramatically. The "Aminiya-Page" or "Consortium" agreement put the Iranian oil in the monopoly of several transnational companies for 25 years. With the signing of this contract at the end of 1942, during the next 5 years, oil production increased from 16 to 52 million tons per year. In those five years, foreign exchange earnings from oil exports rose from \$ 140 million to \$ 360 million. The Americans were in charge of Annan's economic planning. The Shah publicly proclaimed the "White Revolution" and implemented land reform based on Truman Principle 4. The volatile capacities of Iran's economy, especially in the oil and large industries, paved the way for a dramatic leap in economic statistics (and, of course, not economic fundamentals), a process that began and lasted for more than a decade. Statistics show that the staggering growth of this time never continued after the Islamic Revolution, although its fluctuations have diminished, thus: Iran's GDP (roughly the size of the economy) from about \$ 4 billion in 1960 to \$ 11 billion in 1970 (1349 AD) and finally reached \$ 90 billion on the eve of the revolution (this figure, at its peak in 2012, reached \$ 600 billion and is now about \$ 400 billion). Iran's economic growth (roughly a year in one year) was generally above 10 percent during the 1960s, and even in 1965, 1969, and 1976 it experienced an incredible 17 percent. This level of growth is not seen even in the experience of China in recent years.

In addition, Bakht was with Shah Yar. The price of a barrel of crude oil, which was less than \$ 21 in July 1973 (July 1946), reached \$ 56 in January (December 52). The rising price of oil continued until an unprecedented record of \$ 126 in April 1980. After that, the price of oil gradually returned to the \$ 30- \$ 50 channel over the years. Ideal conditions were created from the sale of this God-given wealth, what better conditions than for the Westerners themselves to take oil with their own technology and pay for it to the Iranian economy?! (Mohammad Reza, of course, took the liquidity from the unsold sale of oil directly by buying weapons and other fancy and luxury items, with the help of people like Toofanian, and returned it to the Americans.) On the other side of the story, conventional economic views say that this is normally expected. The growth trend is highly inflationary, but statistics show that in the decade before 1973, despite the astronomical growth of the Iranian economy, there is no news of inflation! Inflation rate in this period is around zero.

"The Golden Age of Economy in the Second Pahlavi Era"

From the time the second Pahlavi came to power in 1943 until the eve of the revolution, with the transfer of 50 percent of oil revenues to the "consortium", at least half of Iran's oil revenues were in the hands of the Westerners. A significant portion of the other half was spent filling the pockets of the few people who wore hats. The growth of oil sales, as well as the development of armaments, ready-made items, and large non-endogenous and imported industries (assembly industries that lacked domestic technology and capability), over a decade led panels and panels to show the fatness of Iran's economy. Extreme extraterrestrials and virtual, unrealistic, heterogeneous and unjust

growth became the Achilles' heel for the collapse of the oil economy, the foundations of the second Pahlavi era, an element that, along with the lack of political development and dictatorship of the ruling regime, turned into a violent storm of popular anger. (!) Wrapped the side.

Economic situation and the establishment of a strong economy in the country

The tools for having a better and stronger healthy economy are based on various factors, such as a spirit of self-confidence and confidence, industry and avoiding a monocentric economy; But this did not happen in the Pahlavi regime. Some of these are as follows:

A) Lack of self-confidence and self-confidence

Among the leaders of the Pahlavi regime, there was no confidence and self-confidence to build Iran; Therefore, despite Iran having domestic experts and specialists, the administration of the country was given to foreign experts who were trying to hold the country back. The Pahlavi regime signed a contract for the presence of more than 50,000 foreign advisers and experts in various military, oil, engineering, dam construction, etc. ; While Iranian experts were not allowed to show their skills and creativity; For example, Iranian engineers in the Air Force were not allowed to maintain aircraft, and all the repair and preparation steps were carried out in large numbers by American advisers. "Iranians who can not build a sun, you want to run the refinery!" Razmara shouted at the delegates who wanted to nationalize the oil industry. This kind of self-destruction in the Shah and his governments was the source of many problems in the country, such as national backwardness and foreign domination of the country's destiny. Imam Rahel said about self-sufficiency after the revolution: "This victory that you achieved, because you believed that you can; You believed that America could not impose on you. "In these two years, in our country, many industries that they did, do it themselves, and believe me, we can have an industry and we can have an initiative."

B) Assembly and related industry

Due to the export of more than 5.5 million barrels of oil and the huge income of the Pahlavi regime from this place, the leaders of the Pahlavi regime did not have much incentive to invest in industry and agriculture and mostly sought to import foreign goods. In the sectors where limited investment was made in industries, it was mainly assembly industries where all manufactured parts were imported. Ahmad Ali Massoud Ansari says that if there had been no revolution, Iran's economic and military progress would have continued for some time; But for many reasons it could not continue. One of the most important reasons is that the governing body considered itself the master and the nation the subjects, and this kind of attitude on the part of the growing nation of Iran was intolerable.

C) Allocation of national wealth to the court and statesmen

The royal family owned a large portion of the wealth. The total wealth of this family was more than twenty billion dollars. Also, most of the lucrative contracts and lucrative government projects were concluded with government officials. According to one estimate, in 1355-1352 alone, the commission of government officials exceeded one billion dollars. On the other hand, the National Oil Company secretly and permanently deposited large sums of money into the Shah's personal account, bringing the Shah's personal capital to \$ 1 billion.

The Shah's brothers and sisters and their associates were also major shareholders in many domestic companies, earning hundreds of millions of dollars. "... The Shah's own securities alone are worth more than \$ 1 billion, and in the last two years alone, between \$ 2 billion and \$ 4 billion has been transferred to the United States by the Iranian royal family," the New York Times reported.

D) Ignorance of the deprived and poor class

The economic approach of the Pahlavi regime was based on giving ground to princes, princes, princesses, court elements, army chiefs and SAVAK. Failure to distribute public wealth fairly would lead to the economic growth of a particular class affiliated with the government. Hoveyda has said that the assembly and import industries were largely left to the court-affiliated families, who formed the Pahlavi bourgeoisie. Reza Pahlavi's domination of all the pillars of Iranian society, its economy, politics and culture, was in practice in conflict with the parallel distribution of wealth. For this reason, despite the implementation of noisy programs (White Revolution - land reform, etc.) there was no change in the lives of most people. According to Soraya, "neighborhoods in the south of the city [of Tehran] with paralyzed soldiers whose dirty water is used for food after passing laundries and being contaminated with stray debris and dogs, paralyzed children, hungry women and old men, the mud of the streets whose houses are like "It does not have neighborhoods ruled by absolute poverty." Accordingly, during the Taghut period, a small percentage of Iranians had access to various services, and due to the lack of facilities, health services, proper roads, electricity, etc., life was associated with many problems for many villagers, with high mortality. One of the natural consequences of this

condition was especially in infants and young children. In 1974, according to official statistics, only 39 percent of rural children of school age had access to public education; Hence, the late Imam; They strongly criticized the situation of the Shah's regime: "God knows that ... he comes to me, because we want to build a water reservoir somewhere, his people do not have water; These women have to go from a mile away to get water. They do not have water ... you go and see the other side of Tehran. "You go and see the pits that exist, the pits there ...". The Supreme Leader said: "The Islamic system came and changed the wrong plan and plan that existed in this country, which did not grant any rights to villages and rural areas and distant cities and deprived classes. Today, our servant government is most concerned about the deprived areas; "And a lot of work and a lot of service has been done."

3) The priority of militarism over the development of the country

About 40 percent of the country's budget was allocated to the army, and the number of troops and personnel was increasing every day. Accordingly, the Shah's excessive militaristic approach was such that Iran's military budget, which was about 100 billion rials in 1350, increased to 566.8 billion rials in 1355. This figure indicates the staggering growth of militarism to play the role of the Iranian gendarmerie for the United States in the region and indicates the destruction of national revenues in the Shah's disease.

F) Spillover of national capital

The 2,500-year-old imperial celebrations were spent with extravagance and endless waste of our national capital, while more than half of the population lived in poverty in villages and suburbs of large cities. Mansour Rafizadeh writes about the Shah's celebration: "I obtained a list from the SAVAK shopping department, according to which the task of cooking the celebration food was entrusted to the Maxim restaurant in Paris. The decoration of 59 guest tents and three royal tents, all equipped with air conditioning, in the desert was entrusted to the French company Johnson in Paris. The company was also responsible for remodeling the White House for Jacqueline Kennedy. The baths were made of French marble, the candlesticks were made of Chinese limogis, and the crystals were made of Baccarat. For these celebrations, 165 male and female waitresses, 25 cosmetologists (male and female), 1,500 men's hats, 300 half hats, 400 pairs of eyelashes and French clothes were considered. According to an October 15 report in Time magazine, 3.5 tons of butter and cheese, half a ton of cream, 250 bottles of wine (\$ 840,000), colored lamps and carpets and rugs for all tents, landscaping that includes several thousand pieces of green space and several thousand crowns It was flowering, it was all brought from Paris by the Iranian Air Force ... Twice a month flights.

Economic independence and self-sufficiency

Western hegemonic regimes had regulated their political and economic relations with the Pahlavi regime in such a way that the Iranian government was always economically dependent on them. To achieve this goal, the dominating powers believed in experts that they did not have the talent to achieve self-sufficiency and economic independence. By instilling a spirit of self-doubt in Iranian specialists, they created a feeling of extreme humiliation. In an article in 1974, Franz Fitzgerald stated that "Iran's situation in general is far worse than that of a country like Syria, which has neither oil nor political stability; "Because the Shah has never made a serious effort to develop the country ..."; And while one of the important goals of the revolution was to gain economic independence; Therefore, the constitution also mentions "preventing foreign economic domination of the country's economy" from the economic criteria of the Islamic Republic of Iran. For this reason, from the very beginning of the victory of the revolution, the officials of the system took steps towards economic independence and self-sufficiency.

Fair distribution of public wealth

Before the revolution, 30 percent of the country's population consisted of wealthy households, which accounted for 90 percent of the country's total income, and another 70 percent had only 10 percent of the country's income. The unbalanced distribution of income has left millions suffering from poverty, inflation and unemployment. Comparing before and after the revolution, the Supreme Leader said: "... Yes, we have made progress in distributing public resources to all parts of the country. It was a day when most of the country's resources were spent in special areas for the powerful of that day and for the court of that day; Many provinces and cities did not benefit from the public resources of the country! This was an injustice. "Today, when we see them in terms of services, in terms of road construction, in terms of building highways and freeways and convenient roads, they have it all over the country."

Deprivation

Unfortunately, the Pahlavi regime was not active in eliminating deprivation. Regarding the situation before and after the revolution, Imam Raheel said: "You know that a country of this width and length and greatness that ruined all its places ... You have done a miracle so far that you have done so much ...; "During the fifty years, there were ruins, and during those two years, all the work and services in the whole country, especially in the villages ... have been done or are about to be done."

Economic indicators of Iran in the Pahlavi era

"Seeing hundreds of thousands of dissidents and dissidents like lightning struck the king, and that shock was so effective and strong that it paralyzed him mentally and emotionally." This sentence is the last picture of the Shah on December 16, 1978, which was mentioned by John Stampel (Second Secretary of the US Embassy in Tehran) in his book "On the Islamic Revolution". In the last four decades, the reasons for the revolution have been discussed from various economic, social, political and cultural aspects. The present report mainly refers to some socio-economic indicators of the last decade of the Pahlavi dictatorial regime. The socio-economic situation in Iran during the second Pahlavi period was favorable based on what foreign monarchists say, or what is said in the media of the Islamic Republic is merely blackmail. In this regard, in order to better assess the situation of socio-economic indicators in the country in the 50s, these indicators, in addition to reviewing domestic statistics (Central Bank statistics and official census), in analytical comparisons with the situation in the region, including Turkey (neighboring Iran), Egypt (rival) Libya (oil country) and Syria have also been surveyed. What happened to \$ 20 billion in oil revenue in one year? The years 1932 to 1957 in Iran are the source of very wide economic, social and political events; These include the nationalization of the oil industry in 1943, land reforms in 1941, the unbridled increase in oil sales in the early 1950s, the mass migration of villagers, and the uncontrolled expansion of urbanization. During this period, with the increase in oil revenues, economic growth and GDP of Iran, which are among the most important macroeconomic indicators, increased significantly, such as Iran's GDP from 44 thousand billion rials in 1953 to 242 thousand billion rials in 1963 Receipts and economic growth have fluctuated from 5 to 17 percent during the period.

Economic diplomacy of Iran and Afghanistan in the Pahlavi period

Afghanistan is a part of the lands that were culturally and historically part of the Iranian lands and was separated from Iran in the 18th and 19th centuries. Before that, this land always included a part of Greater Khorasan, which was the origin of many Iranian cultural outputs. Before the separation of these lands, a part of Khorasan came to you before the separation among the Iranians, and a part of it was also known as Kabulistan. The term Afghan, which means a special tribe, was applied to it after the separation from Iran. It goes without saying that due to the deep cultural, economic and political ties between the two countries, there have been ups and downs between the two countries. But the political relations between the two countries have always depended on the role and influence of external factors, ie the great powers, and most of the time it was the great powers that were the main players in the relations between the two countries. Afghanistan and Iran are in a very sensitive position from a geopolitical point of view, which has always been the focus of the great powers, and all the efforts of the great powers to influence these two countries are felt throughout history. The process of political relations between the two countries has also been influenced by the role of the great powers. During the reign of Reza Shah, the relations between Iran and Afghanistan had a friendly trend. Iran recognized Afghanistan's independence from British protection in 1300 and established an embassy in Kabul. In the same year, the Non-Aligned Movement and Iran-Afghanistan Pact were concluded in Kabul. Amanullah Khan in 1308 with the change of government in Afghanistan Iran recognized the government of Mohammad Nader Shah and in 1309 the Iranian embassy in Kabul was promoted to the rank of major embassy. The border disputes between Iran and Afghanistan in Sistan and Khorasan regions were resolved by the Turkish government in 1313 and the relations between the two countries improved even more.

Saadabad Regional Pact

In the years between the two world wars, Britain dominated the entire Middle East, and the conclusion of a defense pact between the Middle Eastern countries after the end of World War I among the British rulers emerged as a barrier to prevent the expansion of Soviet influence in the Persian Gulf. And oil wells in the Middle East were deemed necessary. The foreign ministers of Turkey, Iraq, Afghanistan and Iran met in Tehran in 1942 and signed a friendship and non-aggression pact between the four countries called the Saadabad Pact. However, the emergence of the element and its influence among the countries of the region, especially Iran, caused this treaty not to be implemented.

At the same time, other measures were taken in the field of international cooperation and expansion of relations with the countries of the region during the time of Mohammad Hashem Khan. Afghanistan also sought to strengthen

its relations with Islamic countries in the region through a multilateral agreement. The idea was mainly raised by Iranian politicians who had previously resolved their border disputes with Afghanistan in the 1980s under the auspices of Turkey and Iraq through direct negotiations between the two countries. Afghanistan responded positively to his proposal, and after a series of exchanges in 1937, a four-party treaty of friendship, non-aggression and consultation on important international issues between Afghanistan, Iran, Turkey and Iraq was signed in Tehran. The Saadabad Treaty became famous. Shortly after the signing of the treaty, and using the favorable atmosphere that resulted from its conclusion in the relations between the two countries, the Iranians again raised the issue of dividing the Helmand River. The government of the men of the two countries has always tried to have good relations with each other and complement each other with good neighborliness, although there are cases where tensions between the two countries have arisen due to the intervention of imperialist powers, but in general, after the Herat war, which took place during the Qajar period, during the Pahlavi era, friendly relations with negotiations and talks between the two countries prevailed. After the third war with Britain, Afghanistan realized the establishment of close relations with its historical neighbor Iran. The situation in Iran at that time was very turbulent in terms of politics, and the peaceful country of Iran was under foreign military occupation, and colonial policy in the provinces of Tilan, Kurdistan and Khorasan, as well as among the southern tribes of Iran, caused riots and riots, feudal lords of each country in the face of the central government, they boasted of independence and autonomy because Hussein Ali Taleh, Amir of the Khalkhali nomads, Sargham Khan, etc. in Khuzestan had sold himself to England. It was in 1921 that Britain evacuated Iran from its military forces. However, some troops remained in the ports of Bahrain, Dezdab, Kerman and the island of Bahrain. It was in this year that Reza Khan became the commander of the Cossack force in Iran. Overthrew and annihilated the separatist feudal lords, the government became centralized and later became a personal military dictator and a Taliban dictator. In any case, as soon as the Afghan government had the opportunity, Sardar Abdul Aziz Khan sent one of his agents with a history of Iran to Iran as a political representative, Sardar Red Tehran presented his contents to the Iranian government in five items. Request for opening friendly talks, exchange of ambassadors, establishment of Afghan consul in Mashhad, establishment of postal relations and trade relations. Negotiations between the Afghan representative and Iranian officials led to a long-term agreement between the two governments almost a year later. The treaty was signed by Sardar Abdul Aziz Khan, the ambassador of Afghanistan, and Mirza Hassan Khan, the foreign minister of Iran, on May 1, 1300, while Majd al-Mulk was appointed to the Iranian embassy in Afghanistan a year earlier in October 1910.

The era of Mohammad Reza Shah

The relations between Iran and Afghanistan during the time of Mohammad Reza Shah should be examined in the context of the situation in Iran at that time. After Dr. Mossadegh announced a policy of negative balance and his slogan was independence from the superpowers, the global atmosphere demanded that countries with moderate power be linked to one of the power blocs. The same policy of Dr. Mossadegh led to the coup d'etat against him in August 1932, and finally Dr. Mossadegh came down from power. It was after the fall of Dr. Mossadegh that the then Iranian government chose the option of uniting with the Western bloc and entered the fold of pro-Western countries. With the entry of Iran into the Baghdad Security Treaty (Sento), it turned to an alliance with the West. During these years, Iran's foreign policy was formed in order to be more fully aligned with the West and the United States. During this period, the government of Iran made many efforts to attract foreign investment to the country in order to make the necessary investments to advance its social development programs. It was during these years that the government of Mohammad Daud Khan ruled Afghanistan. He sought to pursue his reform programs in Afghanistan as quickly as possible. Therefore, he tried to get closer to the Western countries, which during these years, in order to prevent the infiltration of communism, provided financial and weapons aid to the surrounding countries, and to put aside the traditional conservatism common in Afghanistan. US Vice President Nixon's visit to Kabul explicitly outlined the wishes and aspirations of his administration to seek financial and military assistance from the United States and to move closer to the United States. These demands were met by the United States' refusal to comply with them. The United States has made aid conditional on de-escalation of tensions between Pakistan and Afghanistan. This rejection of the US request shifted Kabul's gaze to Moscow. From here, the cornerstone of Afghanistan's dependence on Moscow was formed and Afghanistan turned to the socialist center. In the mid-1930s, with the expansion of Afghanistan's dependence on the Soviet Union at the political, military, economic, and even civil and cultural levels, a group of left-wing young people in Afghanistan who were Soviet-trained were the first to establish an ideologically driven regime. It was that Afghanistan, in fact, threw itself into the arms of a power that was gradually promoting Marxist ideas among the people of that country. It was not able to act as a regional supporter for Afghanistan, but there was basically no desire in those years for independent regional action in the Iranian government.

Issue on Helmand and Iran-Afghanistan relations

Since Afghanistan's secession from Iran under the Paris Agreement, there has been a dispute between the two countries over the waters of the Helmand River. According to Article 6 of the Paris Agreement, the parties must accept British mediation in the event of a dispute. The same thing happened in '5. At that time, there was a dispute between Iran and Afghanistan over the demarcation of the Sistan border. The English "General" Goldsmith was appointed as the judge, and Sistan was divided into two main and foreign parts. Main Sistan, the area west of the Helmand River, was ceded to Iran, and foreign Sistan, east of the river, was ceded to Afghanistan. At the same time, Goldsmith declared that irrigation and agriculture in Sistan using Helmand water should be provided and Iran should be given priority, and any action in the upper part of Helmand should be done with Iran's consent, but a quarter of a century later the Helmand River made its way to the soil. Afghanistan changed, and then another British order, Colonel McMahan, came to Iran to address the issue. The commission determined the Iran-Afghanistan border along the Helmand River to the point where the river is divided into two branches. Thus, the issue of Helmand water became more serious than before. In 1995, Iran and Afghanistan signed an agreement called "Kuhak" in which it was agreed to divide Helmand water in half from a specific source, but this agreement was not implemented, again for two years. Later, the same issue was mentioned in the Kabul agreement and the parties undertook to refrain from any action that would cause water shortages in another land. But the Afghan government also refused to implement the agreement under the pretext of not approving it. At the end of World War II, a commission was formed with the participation of three experts from Chile, the United States and Canada. The commission, dubbed the "Delta", argued that Iran had a right to prioritize Sistan's water consumption over other uses created after 1996, and that the Afghan government should not engage in operations that would cause water shortages in Sistan. Iran refused to accept the commission's decision because the commission had ignored the actions taken by the Afghan government before. After that, the Iranian and Afghan sides negotiated several times, but to no avail. At the same time, the then government of Afghanistan decided to control a part of Helmand water and use it for its lands by constructing a dam. Many Iranian politicians believe that the Kajaki Dam was built during the Taliban regime, but this is not the case. At the same time as the construction of the dam, the volume of water from the Helmand River that flows into the Hamoon was greatly reduced.

Haqabeh Iran from Helmand

Iran's water supply from the Helmand River, which originated in Afghanistan and flowed into Iran, has always been one of the main points of contention and the reason for Iran's protest against Afghanistan. After the secession of Herat from Iran in 1857 (AD) under the Treaty of Paris and the refusal of the Afghan government to allow the flow of the Helmand River into Iran, British Raj officers attempted to determine the border between Iran and Afghanistan. The first legal regime of Helmand was written by one of the same officers named General Goldsmith in 1251 A.D. (1872 AD). The summary of Goldsmith's ruling was that both Iran and Afghanistan should have equal access to Helmand water. They should not be to the detriment of Iran. But again a dispute arose between the two countries, and in 1281 Colonel McMahan was appointed to investigate. Iran stipulated that Goldsmith's opinion must be taken into account in McMahan's vote, otherwise it would not accept the arbitration, and because it finally recognized McMahan's vote as against Goldsmith's, it refused to accept it.

Thus, the same agreement on equal distribution of water was officially established and officials left Iran and distributed water, although in practice Iran's share was more than half and sometimes three-quarters or more of the water came to Iran, which provoked Afghan protests. .

During the reign of Reza Shah Pahlavi, when the two countries took steps to get closer to each other, they started negotiations on disputes over borders and Helmand border in 1921, which in 1925 resolved border disputes and on the 6th of Bahman (Aquarius) 1913 signed a declaration between The Iranian ambassador to Kabul and Ali Mohammad Khan, Afghanistan's foreign minister, led in Kabul, where the two countries agreed that every year the water from the Helmand River that reaches the Kamal Khan Dam would be divided equally between the two countries.

The Afghan government has pledged not to build a new waterway between the ten or four towers and the Kamal Khan Dam, in order not to consume more than the amount of water used to carry it from Kamal Khan Dam. Both the governments of Iran and Afghanistan also pledged not to take any action or operation from Kamal Khan Dam to Deh Dost Mohammad Khan and Sikh Sarkeh, which was the last water division, to reduce the share of either side.

The National Assembly of Iran approved the declaration, but the Afghan parliament refused to approve the declaration, and as a result, the Afghans began digging the Baqra and Siraj streams in an engineered manner, depriving Iran of much of Helmand water. The Afghans had diverted water to Khaja Ali and Qazi Shirjan and diverted it to new streams, and some of the water that passed through the area sank in Gohak Dam. The issue of digging a creek in Afghanistan and reducing Helmand water for Iran has reached the public and media. The first official and

public warning was given by Mutasim al-Saltanah Farrokh, the representative of Sistan in the National Assembly in 1924, which was denied by the Afghan embassy in Tehran.

Once again, Mohammad Ali Monsef, a representative of Birjand and Ghaenat in a speech to the National Assembly on March 23, 1958, warned that Afghans were digging a new stream along the Helmand River, 15 km south of Karshak in Kandahar province, which was five to nine meters deep, up to 59 meters. It is more than two hundred kilometers wide and employs 24,000 to 36,000 workers with new machinery under the supervision of foreign engineers, and if it runs out and flows, "I do not think there will be a Sistani later.

The number of dams that Afghanistan built on Helmand water increased: Siraj dam, Kaz Kashk dam, Rudbar dam, Mehrabad dam, Chahar Borjeh dam, Kamal Khan dam, Qala-e-Fatah dam, dormitory dam and one or two boiler dams. Helmand water in Iran decreased so significantly that in 1926 alone, it led to the death of more than 2400 cows and mass migration of Sistan residents. The issue was reported in the media and provoked protests.

In early 1926, the Iranian government proposed to send a delegation headed by the Minister of Agriculture to Afghanistan to investigate the matter, but the Afghan government refused and considered the visit of the Iranian delegation along the Helmand River as interference in its internal affairs and announced that even if a delegation arrives, Not to implement the declaration of 1917. On the other hand, in October 1917, Iran set a 15-day deadline for Afghanistan to either accept General Goldsmith's ruling or to declare 1917, otherwise it would take any action it deems appropriate.

By refusing to comply with Afghanistan's request, the Iranian government decided to file a complaint with the international community. But US Ambassador to Tehran George Allen stepped in and suggested that the US government mediate to resolve the Iran-Afghanistan dispute over the Helmand River. Accepting the offer, the Afghan Minister of Public Works went to Washington, where he and the Iranian ambassador held separate talks with a mediator nominated by the US government.

On March 15, 1958, the Iranian Embassy in Washington issued a report on the US State Department's theory on the division of Helmand water, suggesting that a three-member technical commission of neutral governments selected by Iran and Afghanistan visit the entire Helmand route in Iran, studying water and The number of streams that branch off from Helmand and the dams and facilities that are built in it, and the consideration and observance of contracts that other countries have concluded in similar cases, recommend their proposals to the parties and the two governments announce their acceptance or rejection within 30 days.

Conclusion

Afghanistan is a landlocked country, and especially in the last century, it has needed to import goods from neighboring countries to supply essential goods. India, Pakistan, Russia and Iran have played an important role in meeting Afghanistan's needs due to its proximity to Afghanistan. In the second Pahlavi period (1957-1920 AD), the relations of the countries in the region were influenced by the atmosphere of the Cold War. Lost goods. As a result, Iran was the most suitable option for exporting goods to Afghanistan and meeting the economic needs of that country. In this study, based on the documents, it has been addressed that despite the smuggling of various goods on the borders of Iran and Afghanistan and the similarity of goods produced by the two countries, what kind of goods were exchanged in the two countries and agreements in the face of questions and doubts related to the Islamic Revolution, it should be noted that the enemies of the Islamic Revolution in the think tanks abroad, using the cyberspace platform, are constantly seeking to blacken and portray the future. They are dark and vague in the minds of everyone, especially our young generation, to insinuate that the Islamic Revolution has achieved nothing; While with a little realistic reflection, it can be clearly seen that due to the existing conditions and limitations, the Islamic Republic has had many successes in improving and improving the living conditions of the people. In this regard, the Supreme Leader said: "I believe that the Islamic system has acted stronger than all the governments that existed in our country during the colonial and near-colonial eras." The requirements for a healthy economy. Better and stronger, based on various factors, such as the spirit of self-confidence and confidence, industry and avoidance of monocentric economy; However, this did not happen in the Pahlavi regime, but in the system of the Islamic Republic, significant successes have been achieved, so that an objective observation of the state of society and statistics show a relative improvement in the living conditions of the majority of society.

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